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LABOR COMMISSION’S REPLY BRIEF 
      ARGUMENT  
I. The District Court was without jurisdiction to consider 
Derek Price’s untimely challenge to the Labor 
Commission’s Order. 
 Mr. Price did not file a timely petition for judicial review from the final 
agency action in this matter.  Utah Code § 63G-4-401(3)(a).  He does not 
challenge this fact in his response brief.  He does not challenge that “[t]he 
timeliness of the . . . petition . . . is a question of jurisdictional significance.”  
Living Rivers v. U.S. Oil Sands, Inc., 2014 UT 25, ¶ 18, 344 P.3d 568.   
 Instead, Mr. Price claims that his failure to file a timely petition for 
judicial review does not matter for two reasons: first, he says he’s only 
defending against a civil enforcement proceeding under Utah Code § 63G-4-
501(3); and second, he says he has the right to seek judicial review without 
exhausting all available administrative remedies in limited circumstances 
under Utah Code § 63G-4-401(2)(b).   
 Mr. Price’s first argument fails because this is not a civil enforcement 
proceeding.  This is a garnishment proceeding.  Section 63G-4-501 was not 
meant to be a catchall provision applying to all possible administrative and 
judicial proceedings.  This is shown by section 63G-4-501(1)(a) that explains 
that civil enforcement proceedings are in “addition to other remedies 
provided by law.”  One such other remedy is a Rule 64 garnishment 
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proceeding.  Indeed, section 501(2)(c) states that an civil enforcement action 
cannot request, nor can the court grant, “any monetary payment apart from 
taxable costs.”  Mr. Price could not use this garnishment proceeding to 
challenge those prior decisions; he could only challenge the garnishment 
itself.  Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 64D does not authorize a challenge to 
the underlying judgment, only to matters related to the garnishment.  This 
Court has already held that district courts lack “subject matter jurisdiction to 
consider a collateral attack on an underlying judgment in the context of the 
garnishment proceedings.”  Utah State Tax Comm’n v. Echols, 2006 UT App 
19, *1 (per curiam).    
 Even if this was a civil enforcement proceeding, Mr. Price’s argument 
was rejected by the Supreme Court.  In Career Service Review Board v. Utah 
Department of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933, 939-40 (Utah 1997), the Court 
applied res judicata and collateral estoppel to prevent the Department of 
Corrections from collaterally attacking the Board’s administrative orders in a 
civil enforcement action brought by the Board).  “Res judicata, which 
subsumes the doctrine of collateral estoppel, applies to administrative 
adjudications in Utah.”  Id. 938 (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  Indeed, the court explained that “[t]he enforcement action before 
us now is not a continuation of the former administrative adjudication, but a 
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separate action to enforce the order in Parker’s grievance proceeding.  Id. 
939.        
  The Utah Supreme Court expressly rejected the claim that a civil 
enforcement action could be used to collaterally attack the decision 
underlying the order at issue in the action.  “This section does not create a 
loophole in the doctrine of collateral estoppel by permitting defendants to 
resurrect issues in an enforcement action that were decided and put to rest in 
previous administrative proceedings between the parties.”  Id. at 940.  Res 
judicata applies to default judgments just as much as it does to other 
judgments.  A default judgment is a final judgment for the purposes of res 
judicata.  “The Judgment by Default was a final judgment, i.e., one which 
puts an end to a lawsuit by declaring that the plaintiff is or is not entitled to 
recover the remedy sought.”  Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 
61 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).  Mr. Price’s claims are barred by res judicata. 
 Second, section 63G-4-401(2)(b) does not apply to this matter.  This 
section permits a party to an administrative proceeding, in limited 
circumstances, to seek immediate judicial review rather than exhaust all 
administrative remedies and wait for the entry of a final agency action.  
Nothing in this statute allows a party to seek untimely judicial review 
through subsequent garnishment proceedings.  Indeed, subsection 3 of the 
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statute requires that a petition for review be filed within 30 days of the entry 
of the final agency action.  Utah Code § 63G-4-401(3)(a).  This Mr. Price 
failed to do.   
II. Utah law does not require the service of notice be sent by 
certified mail in wage claim proceedings. 
 
 The applicable Utah statute requires that notices to parties be mailed.  
Utah Code § 63G-4-201(2)(b)(i) (“mail the notice of agency action to each 
party”).  Nothing in the statute requires that any particular type of mail be 
used, such as certified mail.  Contrary to the district courts’ decision, this 
Court has not required that service be made by certified mail when the rule 
in question required that the service be by “mailing a copy to the last known 
address.”  Davis v. Goldsworthy, 2008 UT App 145, ¶ 13, 184 P.3d 626.  In 
Davis, the district court held that personal service was required to serve the 
defendant a notice to appear personally or appoint new counsel and set aside 
a prior default judgment.  Id. ¶ 8.  In reversing, this Court held that serving 
notice by first class mail was sufficient where the rule simply required the 
service be mailed.  Id. ¶ 13.  The district court erred when it held that a 
statute requiring notice to be mailed meant certified mail.   
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Public Service 
Commission, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992) is not to the contrary.  In that case, 
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the statute required that notice be sent by certified mail.  Id. 825.  The PSC 
had complied with the certified mail requirement, but Anderson still argued 
that he should have been served by personal service.  The Court disagreed 
and held that certified mail was adequate and personal service, or proof of 
actual notice was not required: “The most burdensome form of service 
articulated [in the statute] is certified mail.  Thus, we can infer that, at 
most, the legislature intended that the Commission be obligated to serve its 
orders by certified mail, not by personal service.”  Id. 
 Likewise, this Court recently held that a statute mandating that notice 
be sent by “certified mail” required notice by U.S. Postal Service certified 
mail, not some other method of sending notice.  John Kuhni & Sons Inc. v. 
Labor Commission, 2018 UT App 6, ¶¶ 20-21.  This Court only required the 
use of the statutory method for providing notice.  It did not require, as did 
the district court, the use of a more burdensome method of service.  
 Despite Mr. Price’s implications to the contrary, “actual notice” in an 
administrative proceeding is not the standard for determining whether a 
party was afforded due process.  The Utah Supreme Court rejected that 
standard in Anderson, 839 P.2d at 825 (“We do not believe that the 
Constitution requires actual notice under these circumstances”).   
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 The standard for due process, or service of notice, for an administrative 
proceeding is not the same as that for a civil action commenced under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.  “[N]otice must be ‘reasonably calculated 
under all the circumstances’ to give interested parties an opportunity to 
protect their interests.  Under this standard, the proper inquiry focuses on 
whether the agency ‘acted reasonably in selecting means likely to inform 
persons affected, not whether each [affected person] actually received notice.’”  
Id. (citing Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-
314 (1950)).   
 When adjudicative proceedings are commenced by a State agency, Utah 
law requires that the agency mail the notice of agency action to each party, 
publish the notice of agency action if required by statute, and mail the notice 
of agency action to any other person who has a right to notice under statute 
or rule.  Utah Code § 63G-4-201(2)(b). 
 In this case, the Commission’s actions satisfied the requirements of due 
process because the Commission’s mailings to Mr. Price were reasonably 
calculated to give him an opportunity to protect his interests.  Mailing the 
original notices of the wage claim, as well as the Preliminary Findings and 
the final Order, to the addresses for Mr. Price found in the Articles of 
Organization for Mad Cow and Level 11 was reasonably calculated to give 
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Mr. Price an opportunity to protect his interests. The Commission acted 
reasonably in selecting these addresses as being the means most likely to 
inform Mr. Price of the matter.  While stating, that the Department of 
Commerce’s business directory was open to fraud, the district court admitted 
that “[n]either party has presented evidence of whether this sort of situation 
has occurred in the past and how often.”  R. 301.       
III. Heaps applies retroactively to those actions that are ongoing. 
 Mr. Price’s argument that Heaps v. Nuriche, LLC, 2015 UT 26, 345 
P.3d 655, should be applied in this appeal fails to address this Court’s prior 
holding that new precedents are applied retroactively only to ongoing actions.  
Home Health & Hospices LLC v. Rita Huber, 2016 UT App 183, ¶¶ 5, 10-12, 
382 P.3d 1074.   
 The default order at issue was entered in 2011.  R. 203-206.  The 
Abstract of Judgment was filed in the district court on June 6, 2012.  R. 1-2.  
The underlying administrative action had been completed well before Heaps 
was decided.  Mr. Price’s argument would require a new decision to be 
applied to unappealed final orders.  New decisions should only be applied in 
ongoing actions, including those timely appealed from a lower court’s decision 




LABOR COMMISSION’S RESPONSE BRIEF 
 STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 The district court denied attorney fees “at this point” based on a 
question of fact.  R. 305.  Has Mr. Price properly briefed his attorney fees 
issue when he fails to address the actual decision made by the district court?  
 Preservation and Standard of Review 
 This issue was ruled on by the district court.  R. 305.  “A district 
court’s factual findings are reviewed deferentially under the clearly erroneous 
standard, and its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness with some 
discretion given to the application of the legal standards to the underlying 
factual findings.”  Ericksen v Ericksen, 2018 UT App 184, ¶ 12 (internal 
quotation omitted). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 The district court denied Mr. Price’s motion for attorney fees, holding 
that there were insufficient facts in the record to make the necessary finding 
of bad faith.  “At this point, it is insufficient to demonstrate that the 
Commission acted in bad faith.”  R. 305.  The court explained that if the 
Commission proceeded in this matter “based on a prior interpretation of the 




retroactive, it would not be bad faith.  However, the facts are insufficient to 
determine that bad faith has occurred at this juncture.”  Id.   
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Price appeals the denial of his attorney fees that he sought 
pursuant to Utah Code § 78B-5-825.  But he has failed to address the actual 
holding of the district court.  It only denied his motion “at this point” 
because there were inadequate facts in the record to determine whether the 
Commission’s conduct was in bad faith.  Specifically, the court was 
concerned that there was insufficient evidence as to whether the Commission 
was acting in good faith by relying on the advice of its counsel.  R. 305.  The 
current action deals with an abstract of judgment and efforts to collect on the 
Commission’s decision.  Mr. Price has not addressed the district court’s 
actual decision.  Whether or not the facts before the district court were 
adequate has not been briefed. 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Price has failed to address the district court’s actual factual 
findings regarding his claim for attorney fees. 
 Mr. Price sought attorney fees based on his claim that the Commission 
had acted in bad faith in trying to collect on the default judgment against 




default judgment was issued and the garnishment proceeding commenced. 
The district court declined “at this point” to grant his motion because of 
factual questions that remained unresolved.  To award bad faith attorney 
fees, the statute requires both that the case was without merit and that it 
was brought in bad faith.  Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, ¶ 
9, 122 P.3d 556.  Finding that a party acted in bad faith “turns on a factual 
determination of a party's subjective intent.”  Id. (internal quotation 
omitted).  The court must find that one or more of the following factors is 
lacking.  “(1) [a]n honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; 
(2) no intent to take unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, 
or knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will hinder, delay, or 
defraud others.”  Id. at 12 (internal quotations omitted). 
The district court declined to grant Mr. Price’s request for attorney fees 
because it found there were inadequate facts to make its decision on whether 
this test was met.  The court noted that, by statute, the Commission was to 
rely on the legal opinion of its counsel or the attorney general that its order 
“is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law.”  Utah Code § 




on a prior interpretation of the law and believed in good faith that its counsel 
told them it would not be retroactive, it would not be bad faith.”  R. 305. 
Mr. Price claims that the Commission’s failure to return the amount it 
has garnished from him is proof of its bad faith.  Price’s Brief at 44.  And 
yet the district court noted that the Commission does not have that money, it 
had already sent the money to the wage claimant.  R. 304-05. 
It is also significant that the Commission’s challenged decisions and 
the abstract of judgment that it filed with the district court have not been 
overturned.  The district court’s order quashed one particular writ of 
garnishment and ordered Mr. Price to “pursue a motion to set aside in the 
administrative proceeding with notice to all interested parties.”  R. 306. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the district court’s decision should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this    9th   day of Occtober, 2018. 
 
     /s/ Brent A. Burnett      
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Solicitor General 
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